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Fundamental Challenges and New Directions 
Ibrahim Habli 
The University of York, UK 
Sean White 
NHS Digital, Leeds, UK 
Abstract   There is an increasing focus on the importance of the availability and 
interchange of digital health information within health and care organisations as 
a means of improving patient care quality and outcomes. In England, this has 
UHFHQWO\EHHQHPSKDVLVHGWKURXJKWKH*RYHUQPHQW¶VYLVLRQIRUDµSDSHUOHVV¶1D
tional Health Service (NHS) by 2020. The scope of the technology supporting 
health informatics is expanding and is used to improve the integration between 
primary, secondary, community and social care settings. To promote patient-cen-
tred care, mobile apps, wearable devices and social media are used to actively 
involve patients in their own health and well-being management. Despite poten-
tial benefits, the new information-intensive capabilities pose a fundamental 
safety challenge: how should engineers and health and care professionals iden-
tify hazards and assess the risks posed by the technology in this large-scale, com-
plex and dynamic socio-technical system? In this paper, we deconstruct this chal-
lenge and identify concrete safety problems, and opportunities for improvement, 
by examining current practice in hazard and risk analysis for health informatics. 
We then introduce the Safety Modelling, Assurance and Reporting Toolset 
(SMART), which has been developed collaboratively between The University of 
York and NHS Digital to help address these challenges and support clinicians 
and engineers to systematically assure the safety of health informatics.  
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1 Introduction  
It is now widely accepted that healthcare is a complex and adaptive sociotech-
nical system (Meeks et al. 2014). Within this system, there is a continuous need 
to manage and communicate the right information to the right people, at the right 
time and in the right format. This is increasingly being enabled through health 
informatics technologies. These technologies have therefore become a critical in-
frastructure in healthcare, e.g. in complex scenarios such as those involved in 
transferring and maintaining electronic health records and in ePrescribing. Re-
cently, the healthcare landscape has expanded by the use of mobile health apps, 
empowering patients to take a more active role in their care.  
Patient safety is a fundamental concern. These technologies can potentially 
improve patient safety but might also introduce new hazards. For example, ePre-
VFULELQJFDQ UHGXFH WUDQVFULSWLRQHUURUV GXH WRGRFWRUV¶ IDPRXVO\FKDOOHQJLQJ 
handwriting), but might also increase the risk of alert fatigue. 
However, despite the major investments worldwide in health informatics, 
WKHUHUHPDLQV³a large gap between the postulated and empirically demonstrated 
benefits of´ WKHVHWHFKQRORJLHV%ODFNet al. 2011). Further, given the interactive 
nature of health informatics with its care setting, for the safety evidence to be 
credible, research studies have to explicitly and carefully capture the socio-tech-
nical factors associated with the implementation and use of health informatics 
(Sittig et al. 2010). 
In this paper, we explore the challenges of performing hazard and risk analysis 
for health informatics by reviewing current safety assurance practices in England. 
We focus both on areas of strength and improvement. We then introduce the 
Safety Modelling, Assurance and Reporting Toolset (SMART), which has been 
developed to help address these challenges and support clinicians and engineers 
to systematically perform hazard and risk analysis and develop safety cases for 
health informatics. 
 
2 Health informatics, a safety related domain? 
The term health informatics is widely used within the National Health Service 
1+6DQGFDQEHGHVFULEHGDVWKH³optimal use of information, often aided by 
the use of technology, to improve individual health´+HUVK+HDOWK,QIRU
matics is socio-technical in nature and relies on the effective interaction between 
the people providing and receiving care, the information they analyse in making 
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care decisions and the technology that provides the information and supports the 
care processes. These interrelationships are illustrated in Figure 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1. Health Informatics (HI) in context 
Health Information Technology (HIT) is a key enabler of health informatics and 
is now firmly embedded in modern health and social care delivery (NHS Eng-
land). The ability of an organisation to deliver such care can be significantly com-
promised should the integrity of the supporting HIT be affected (Ash et al. 2004). 
Although it was a security rather than a safety event, in May 2017, a global ran-
somware attack infected the IT infrastructure in 48 NHS organisations resulting 
in HIT systems being shut-down and all but emergency care being suspended or 
cancelled (department of Health 2017  
Despite the prominence of HIT within the NHS, paper-based processes still 
exist at a large scale, especially in secondary care, and are used on a daily basis 
to support care management. The UK Government, has established a framework 
WKDWZLOO³give care professionals and carers access to all the data, information 
and knowledge they need ± real-WLPHGLJLWDO LQIRUPDWLRQRQDSHUVRQ¶VKHDOWK
and care by 2020´'HSDUWPHQWRI+HDOWK6LPLODUO\WKH*RYHUQPHQWUHF
ognises the need for more effective integration between the health and social care 
GRPDLQVDQGZLOO³create an electronic database that will provide information 
DERXWZKDWDSHUVRQ¶VFDUHQHHGVDUHDQGZKDWWUHDWPHQWWKH\DUHJHWWLQJ´'H
partment of Health 2013).   
WĞŽƉůĞ 
/ŶĨŽƌŵĂƚŝŽŶ 
dĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ 
,/ 
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The scale and complexity of HIT is wide ranging. There are national services 
such as the Electronic Prescription Service (EPS), which enables a General Prac-
titioner (GP) to create a digital prescription in their desktop system and then au-
thorise the prescription using a unique electronic signature before uploading it to 
QDWLRQDOLQIUDVWUXFWXUH7KLVZLOOWKHQUHOD\WKHSUHVFULSWLRQWRWKHSDWLHQW¶VSUH
ferred pharmacy. On receipt, the Pharmacist can pull-down the electronic pre-
scription into their desktop HIT system and prepare the medications in advance 
of the patient arriving at the pharmacy.   
Another form of HIT is Telehealth, which enables the sharing of data between 
a patient and their carer at remote locations, potentially reducing the need for 
unnecessary face-to-face consultations, where appropriate. Typically, telehealth 
is used to monitor patients with long-term conditions such as chronic heart failure 
or those that have recently been discharged from hospital. Sensors and wearable 
devices provide real-time information, which can be communicated to the care 
practitioner.   
But in what way is HIT a safety-related system? Figure 2 illustrates how health 
informatics can contribute to patient harm in a typical care journey.  
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2.  Health informatics hazard contribution 
Care delivery differs in many respects to that of more widely recognised safety 
related domains. A care journey is dynamic in nature, influenced by the underly-
ing patient conditions, variance in operating procedures, varied stakeholders, 
configurations of the supporting technology and the unpredictable day to day op-
eration of a health or care organisation. Invariably the care journey, which is often 
long and complex, starts from an unsafe state and transitions to a safer state i.e. a 
patient will have a life impacting condition or complaint that is subsequently 
managed to point where it is eradicated or its impact reduced. Conversely, for 
example, an aircraft journey starts from a safe state and the aircraft is 
HI  
Contribution 
Hazard Care Context Harm 
Drug mapping 
error in GP Pre-
scribing system 
Patient receives 
unintended 
medication 
Patient is aller-
gic to the pre-
scribed medica-
tion 
Patient suffers 
allergic reaction 
and requires 
specialist hospi-
tal treatment. 
Ambulance dis-
patch system 
has wrong des-
tination data 
Patient experi-
ences delay in 
care delivery 
Patient has 
health condition 
that requires 
timely assess-
ment 
Patient health 
condition dete-
riorates, poten-
tially to critical 
levels 
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subsequently managed to preserve that safe state or to safely manage any devia-
tions from it.   
3 Health informatics - current safety practice in the NHS 
3.1 Current safety standards 
In England, the NHS has been promoting and supporting risk-based approaches 
for HIT safety assurance through the Health and Social Care Act (2012) and by 
establishing a dedicated Clinical Safety Team at NHS Digital. NHS Digital is a 
public body within the Department of Health that is responsible for providing 
data and HIT systems for commissioners, analysts and clinicians in health and 
social care. Two safety standards, SCCI0129 (SCCI 2013) targeting HIT manu-
factures SCCI0160 (SCCI 2013) targeting care organisations have been issued 
by the Standardisation Committee for Care Information on behalf of NHS Eng-
land. These standards specify normative requirements, supported by informative 
guidance, for the implementation of a risk management process and demonstra-
tion of organisational commitments. These standards mandate the appointment 
of Clinical Safety Officers (CSOs) who, in their capacity as experienced clini-
cians, are expected to lead the HIT risk management activities.  
The SCCI0129 and SCCI0160 safety standards follow the risk management 
principles established for medical devices and are consistent with ISO14971 (ISO 
2009). The overall risk management process is depicted Figure 3.  
The risk management process commences with defining the HIT system and 
its clinical scope. This includes the intended system functionality, e.g. prescrib-
ing or patient identification, and the specific care setting within which the system 
is deployed, e.g. maternity unit. Once the scope is established, hazards are iden-
tified principally by considering how the HIT system could fail or be misused.  
,QWKLVFRQWH[WDKD]DUGLVGHILQHGDV³SRWHQWLDOVRXUFHRIKDUPWRDSDWLHQW´
(SCCI 2013), e.g. the patient receives more than the intended drug dose. The risk 
RIHDFKKD]DUG LV WKHQHVWLPDWHG$ULVN LVGHILQHGDV WKH³FRPELQDWLRQRI WKH
VHYHULW\RIKDUPWRDSDWLHQWDQGWKHOLNHOLKRRGRIRFFXUUHQFHRIWKDWKDUP´6&&,
2013), e.g. the likelihood that the patient suffers a permanent life-changing inca-
pacity as the result of the drug overdose. Each risk is then evaluated against pre-
defined acceptability criteria, e.g. as defined in a risk matrix. 
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Fig. 3. SCCI0129/SCCI0160 Risk Management Process 
Next, options are identified and analysed for controlling the risks that are deemed 
unacceptable, e.g. through redundancy, supervision or monitoring. In the rare 
case that a risk is deemed unacceptable and further control is not practicable, 
additional analyses are required to determine if the clinical benefits outweigh the 
residual clinical risk. Otherwise, the project has to be re-appraised. Following the 
implementation and verification of the risk control measures, the organisation has 
to evaluate the outcome of all subsequent activities, i.e. whether residual risks 
can be accepted.  
The final three activities in the risk management emphasise the through-life 
nature of safety analysis and the importance of reviewing and updating the safety 
data during deployment, use, monitoring and maintenance. It is important to em-
phasise the importance of post-deployment monitoring, particularly in assessing 
the effectiveness of the risk control measures, based on use data, and the on-going 
identification of any new safety conditions, e.g. hazards that were missed in the 
initial hazard analysis. 
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3.2 An implicit safety argument 
In addressing the risk management requirements of the SCCI0129 and SCCI0160 
standards, organisations effectively comply with a core, implicit, risk-based ar-
gument that forms the essence of the clinical safety case. 
This implicit argument is made explicit in Figure 4 using the Goal Structured 
Notation (GSN) (Kelly, Weaver 2004).  
 
Residual Risks 
Residual clinical risks from all 
identified hazards are 
accepted and managed
HIT Safety 
Health IT is safe to use 
in the defined care 
setting
HIT
HIT 
Specifications
Care Setting
Care Setting 
Description
Risk Strategy
Argument based on 
HIT clinical risks
Hazard Log
List of hazards and 
associated clinical 
risks
Accepted Risk
Accepted: clinical risk 
meeting acceptance 
criteria or outweighed by 
clinical benefits
Clinical Risk 
Matrix
Clinical Risk Matrix
Controlled Risk
Given defined controls, the 
clinical residual risk associated 
with hazard instances meets 
acceptance criteria
Acceptable Risk 
Levels
Hazards associated with 
acceptable levels of 
clinical risk
Clinical Benefits
Overriding clinical benefits 
outweigh the residual clinical risk 
and further control is not 
practicable  
HL 1
Hazard Log 
(acceptable 
clinical risks)
Unacceptable Risk 
Levels
Hazards associated with 
unacceptable levels of 
clinical risk
HL 2
Hazard Log 
(unacceptable 
clinical risks)
Fig. 4. SCCI0129/SCCI0160 Safety Argument 
Briefly, the chain of reasoning within the above argument is as follows: a HIT 
system is safe to use in a defined care setting if the residual risks associated with 
the identified hazards are accepted and managed. A residual risk is accepted if 
either it is within a predefined target (e.g. low/medium in a Clinical Risk Matrix) 
or the clinical benefits of the intended use outweigh the clinical risk.  
Further claims about risk-benefit analysis, severity and likelihood are substan-
tiated by specific evidence, captured in the Hazard Log, considering current and 
future risk controls. 
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Although this argument seems generic, i.e. covering overarching principles in 
risk management regardless of a specific domain, it can be seen as offering con-
fidence that safety assurance practices implemented elsewhere in the traditional 
safety-related engineering domains are incorporated into NHS standards. 
3.3 Review of current safety assurance practices in England  
During 2016, The University of York and NHS Digital undertook a review of 
current clinical risk management practice within HIT manufacturers and deploy-
ing health organisations. The review was achieved through three structured work-
shops (involving 34 clinicians and engineers) and a review of a sample of clinical 
safety case reports for 20 different local and national systems. 
During the workshops, facilitators encouraged the delegates to discuss and re-
flect on how they addressed the key requirement established in the SCCI stand-
ards. The workshops covered the core risk management activities in the 
SCCI0129 and SCCI0160 safety standards, mainly:  
 
x Scope Definition: do we understand the HIT system, both its design and 
use, within the intended health and/or social care setting? 
x Hazard Identification: what are the potential sources of harm? 
x Risk Estimation: what are the likelihood and severity of the harm as-
sociated with the identified hazards?  
x Risk Control: if residual risks are not acceptable, how are these man-
aged? 
x Risk Acceptability: how are decisions made, and by whom, concerning 
risk acceptability? 
 
Positive and negative feedback was recorded and thematically analysed. The con-
clusions are summarised in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Summary of Safety Assurance Factors 
Summary of Findings Recommendations of Participants 
Scope Definition 
x Great variation in the level of detail and 
clarity for specifying the HIT system and 
its clinical environment; 
x 1R FRQVHQVXV RQ NH\ WHUPV µFOLQLFDO
VFRSH¶ µLQWHQGHG XVH¶ DQG µRSHUDWLRQDO
HQYLURQPHQW¶ 
x Good engagement by clinicians though 
often depends on availability rather than 
expertise; 
x Authorship bias: clinicians (contextual) 
vs engineers (technical); 
x Insufficient consideration of variation in 
practice in clinical environment and im-
pact of local HIT configurations; 
x Lack of detailed information on integra-
tion and interfaces with external systems. 
x Modelling notations are needed for in-
tegrating clinical and engineering per-
spectives; 
x Clear definitions to be included in the 
standards; 
x More coverage required for different 
configurations and clinical settings;  
x More emphasis on interoperability re-
quirements. 
Hazard Identification 
x Confusion about the terms hazard, risk, 
harm and quality issues; 
x Difficulty of positioning hazardous fail-
ures of HIT within care processes;  
x Hazards too detailed to reflect potential 
harm to patients; 
x Hazards very generic and poorly linked 
to clinical environment; 
x Hazards identified by manufactures lack-
ing validation for their relevance by de-
ploying health organisations; 
x Lack of early engagement in, and fund-
ing for, hazard identification; 
x Perception of hazard identification as a 
tick box exercise. 
x Publish anonymised Hazard Logs for 
HIT and known hazards of care within 
the NHS; 
x Develop practical guidance on hazard 
identification workshops and tech-
niques; 
x Develop guidance on the necessary 
clinical and engineering expertise 
needed for hazard identification. 
Risk Estimation 
x Two main risk matrices used: NHS Na-
tional Patient Safety Agency (NPSA) and 
NHS Digital, with medium range leading 
to most confusion; 
x Too much customisation leading to com-
plication in risk communication, rating 
and comparison; 
x Insufficient historical data to generate 
empirical estimate of severity and likeli-
hood; 
x Risk parameters estimated qualitatively 
and subjectively, e.g. expert judgement; 
x Expert judgement should be provided 
with clear justification; 
x Hazards biased based on clinical repre-
sentation (of different specialities); 
x Implementation of a consensus risk es-
timation framework is needed to en-
sure consistency and promote learn-
ing; 
x Stressing the importance of customis-
ing standard risk matrices to suit local 
environments;   
x Greater explanation and justification 
needed for severity and likelihood pa-
rameters. 
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Summary of Findings Recommendations of Participants 
x Risk overestimation as a result of confus-
ing likelihood of hazard and likelihood of 
resulting patient harm; 
x Risk classification sometimes performed 
retrospectively; 
x Insufficient consideration of de-
mographics and patient variation. 
Risk Control 
x System re-design most desirable (remov-
ing source of hazard or carefully imple-
menting alerts); 
x Training and appealing to clinical exper-
tise most common; 
x Training generally regarded as a weak 
(and too generic) risk control; 
x Choice of control depends on phase: re-
design during development and worka-
rounds after deployment; 
x Alert fatigue regarded as a source of con-
cern; 
x Concerns about lack of documentation, 
traceability and assessment of changes in 
risk controls; 
x Lack of explicit evidence and feedback 
about the effectiveness and suitability of 
risk controls; 
x  
x Importance of diversity and balance in 
risk control types; 
x Appealing to vigilance by clinicians 
should depend on detectability; 
x Training to be specific, justified and 
on-going; 
x Proactive monitoring of, and feedback 
on, workarounds and design changes. 
Risk Acceptance 
x Lack of documented clinical justification 
and technical explanation for risk ac-
ceptance; 
x 5DUHXVHRIWKHµ$V/RZ$V5HDVRQDEO\
3UDFWLFDEOH¶$/$53SULQFLSOH 
x No clearly established accountability and 
responsibilities of the stakeholders in-
volved in risk acceptance decisions (sen-
ior management and CSOs); 
x Clear emphasis on professional registra-
tion and judgement of clinicians.  
x Define more clearly the roles, respon-
sibilities, authority and resources 
within both manufacturers and health 
organisations; 
x Greater emphasis on interpretation and 
justification of acceptance decisions. 
 
Four themes that cut across the different HIT risk management activities were 
identified, representing two areas of strength: establishment of a systematic ap-
proach to risk management and close engagement by clinicians; and two areas 
for improvement: greater depth and clarity in hazard and risk analysis practices 
and more organisational support for assuring safety. These themes are summa-
rised in Table 2.  
The data indicates that the assurance framework established through the 
SCCI0129 and SCCI0160 standards has provided a principled approach to risk 
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management, building on best practice in system safety (e.g. the use of Hazard 
Logs and Safety Cases). The role of the clinicians, particularly the CSOs, has 
been recognised by the different organisations. Most of the safety analyses are 
clinically-led, with representation from multidisciplinary teams.  
However, concerns exist about the rigour, detail and clarity of the HIT risk 
analysis evidence. The identified HIT hazards, and their associated risks and con-
trols, are rarely specific to the system and the clinical environment, or justified 
in sufficient detail, in order to enable the stakeholders to evaluate and, where 
necessary, challenge the safety beliefs about the system. This issue cannot be 
addressed in isolation of common organisational barriers, particularly with regard 
to making sufficient resources available for implementing the HIT risk manage-
ment process. Unfortunately, these resources are seldom provided. Where they 
exist, such resources are typically used to confirm, rather than assess, the accept-
ability of the risk posed by the system. Risk analysis is also commonly performed 
late in the lifecycle. This often weakens the credibility of the evidence and its 
ability to influence the deployment of the system.  
Table 2. Evaluation Themes 
Theme Examples 
Strengths 
Risk-based: current approach provides a sys-
tematic process and a common language for 
identifying and analysing the risks of hazard-
ous HIT failures, combined with the require-
ments for organisational commitment. 
Wide-scale use of Hazard Logs (HLs) 
and Clinical Safety Case Reports 
(CSCRs) 
CSCRs cover HIT-related hazards, risk 
estimation, available controls and ac-
ceptance statements. 
Clinical engagement: there has been a recogni-
tion of the significant role of clinicians, partic-
ularly CSOs, during HIT risk analysis and ap-
proval. 
CSOs taking a leading role within health 
organisations, manufacturers and NHS 
Digital; 
CSO advice regarded as necessary for 
HIT approval. 
Improvements 
Depth of risk analysis: safety evidence tends to 
be generic and requires more explicit clinical 
and engineering justification in the context of 
the deploying health organisations.  
Risk estimation lacking empirical data, 
relevant to the clinical environment; 
Insufficient clarity about the effective-
ness of risk controls. 
Organisational support: level of organisational 
funding and commitment does not seem to be 
proportionate to the safety criticality of HIT, 
particularly within health organisations. 
Risk analysis performed as a late activity, 
purely for compliance reasons, as a tick-
box exercise; 
Lack of clarity about responsibilities and 
authorities. 
  
The recommendations of the participations can be considered in the context of 
the often-implicit safety argument as illustrated at Figure 5 (i.e. the argument is 
annotated with areas for improvement that are needed in order to improve clarity, 
depth and rigour).  
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In addressing these recommendations, the safety argument and consequential 
safety cases established based on it could be strengthened both in terms of depth 
and specificity of the justification evidence. This goes some way in addressing 
the first improvement area (depth of analysis) but its success is dependent on an 
organisation being committed to supporting and funding safety activities. 
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practicable  
HL 1
Hazard Log 
(acceptable 
clinical risks)
Unacceptable Risk 
Levels
Hazards associated with 
unacceptable levels of 
clinical risk
HL 2
Hazard Log 
(unacceptable 
clinical risks)
Fig. 5. Improved Safety Argument 
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4 Safety Modelling, Assurance and Reporting Toolset 
(SMART) 
4.1 Overview 
Developed as a proof of concept in order to address key hazard and risk analysis 
challenges identified in the review, SMART provides a self-contained and par-
tially-automated assurance environment that integrates the design of the HIT sys-
tem, the modelling of the care setting and the safety analysis and supporting evi-
dence.  It implements a data model, based on the safety argument expressed in 
Figure 4, and leads the analyst through an end-to-end process in a systematic way, 
ensuring the rationale used to make safety assurance details is explicitly captured. 
Further, SMART helps manage traceability between the constituent elements of 
the safety case.   
Figure 6 shows a snapshot of the SMART user interface, which provides the 
editors used for defining the HIT solution, its care setting and Hazard Log. The 
different HIT design, clinical and safety data sources captured through these ed-
itors are integrated via the risk-based argument shown explicitly on the right side. 
The pictorial safety argument is interactive and can be used to navigate between 
different elements of the argument. It is automatically updated as the safety ar-
gument is developed to give a high-level view of progress made.  
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Fig. 6.  SMART Interface 
SMART provides the following core components: 
 
System Editor: A text-based template that enables the analyst to record pertinent 
information that defines the system under assessment, e.g. name, version and 
description. The system can be hierarchically decomposed through the speci-
fication of system functions. One or more systems can be defined within the 
scope of a (safety case) project. 
Care Setting Editor: A text-based template that enables the analyst to define a 
given care setting within which the HIT system is used. Again, it is structured 
to encourage the analyst to record all relevant information that will help in 
describing and understanding the clinical scope of the safety assessment. One 
or more care settings can be defined. 
Care Process Editor: A graphical editor, supported by context-specific text tem-
plates, that uses a very small set of constructs to enable the analyst to define 
the particular care process or patient journey under assessment. 
Risk Matrix: A predefined risk assessment and evaluation framework, derived 
from the one published under SCCI0129 and SCCI0160. This enables a risk 
assessment for all identified hazards to be conducted and automatically man-
aged in the toolset.  
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Hazard Log: Within SMART, the concept of a hazard is specified based on two 
UHODWHGDVSHFWV)LUVWO\WKHDQDO\VWPD\FUHDWH³+D]DUG'HILQLWLRQV´GHVFULE
ing general types of hazard, with no reference to the context within which they 
RFFXU6HFRQGO\WKHDQDO\VWFDQFUHDWHD³+D]DUG,QVWDQFH´DQGDVVRFLDWHLW
ZLWKD³+D]DUG'HILQLWLRQ´$³+D]DUG,QVWDQFH´LVDVSHFLILFRFFXUUHQFHRI
WKH KD]DUG GHILQHG E\ WKH DVVRFLDWHG ³+D]DUG 'HILQLWLRQ´ $ ³+D]DUG ,Q
VWDQFH´LVestablished in a specific care process and is related to a particular 
Activity and its associated HIT functions. This approach ensures that hazards 
are only discussed in a specific context, reducing disagreements about the rel-
ative risk, likelihood and severity of a hazard that may be caused by ambigu-
ous context.  This can be illustrated by an example: Prescribing of medications 
LQDQDFXWHKRVSLWDOLVXQGHUWDNHQLQPDQ\GLIIHUHQW³&DUH6HWWLQJV´HJ0D
WHUQLW\DQG(PHUJHQF\&DUH$³+D]DUG'HILQLWLRQ´RI ³,QFRUUHFW4XDQWLW\RI
0HGLFDWLRQ3UHVFULEHG´ZRXOGEHFUHDWHGZLWKVHSDUDWH³+D]DUG,QVWDQFHV´RI
³,QFRUUHFW4XDQWLW\RI$GUHQDOLQH3UHVFULEHG´$FFLGHQWDQG(PHUJHQF\DQG
³,QFRUUHFW4XDQWLW\RI3HWKLGLQH´0DWHUQLW\7KHVHWZR³+D]DUG,QVWDQFHV´
can then be used to manage the different risk profiles of those hazards in their 
particular care settings. Further, the Hazard Log editor is structured such that 
it ensures the analyst captures the relational logic between a hazard cause(s), 
hazard control(s) and hazard cause(s).  It provides a bowtie editor and enables 
both an initial risk assessment (taking into consideration any existing mitiga-
tions) and residual risk assessment (after incorporation of further mitigations) 
to be made. The Hazard Log editor is available from within the Care Process 
Editor which provides the analyst with a rich view of the care process and in-
scope hazards. Figure 7 shows an example care process, modelling a Medica-
tion Setup, and sample hazard instances associated with one HIT function (Re-
ceive an Alarm). 
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Fig. 7. Modelling a care setting, HIT function and associated hazards. 
Issue Log: Enables test defects or live issues to be associated with particular 
system, setting or care activities. 
Report Generator: Automatically creates a Word-based report that aligns with 
the structure of a Clinical Safety Case Report (CSCR) as expressed in SCCI 
0129 and SCCI 0160. 
4.2 Preliminary evaluation 
SMART has been trialled on a number of HIT system programmes across a range 
of different care settings, involving participants from HIT system manufacturers, 
deploying care organisations and NHS Digital (more specifically: four secondary 
care originations, one national system, two manufacturers and three mobile/tele-
health solutions). The feedback from these evaluations, although still 
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preliminary, has been positive and the toolset has largely addressed the original 
objectives. The evaluation has also identified a small number of limitations in the 
current proof of concept implementation and some suggestions for future devel-
opment of the toolset (e.g. ability to import current care processes). 
Based on the results achieved, NHS Digital is now committed to developing a 
³SURGXFWLRQ´YHUVLRQWKDWZLOOEHPDGHDYDLODEOHIUHHRIFKDUJHWRWKHFDUHFRP
munity and supplier base. 
4.3 SMART evolution 
The vision is for SMART to be adopted by the HIT community and collabora-
tively developed to support that community. Some key areas for future develop-
ment include: 
x A graphical editor to express the relationship between a hazard, its 
causes, its effects and any controls; 
x The ability to zoom in and out of any element of the model, enabling the 
analyst to see the specific detail or to present a high-level view; 
x The use of different colours in the graphical editors to signify the on-
going status of the safety management of key activities; 
x The ability to run queries and generate reports to support operational 
requirements e.g. provide a list of high-risk hazards; 
x The ability to cut and paste elements between different care pathways; 
x 7KHSURYLVLRQRIDOLEUDU\RI³+D]DUG'HILQLWLRQV´ZKLFKFDQEHXVHG
and maintained by the community; 
x The provision of a library of report templates which can be used and 
maintained by the community; 
x An interface that will support the importing of previously created care 
process diagrams; and 
x Mechanisms for dynamically updating the safety case based on real-
time clinical data (Denny et al. 2015). 
5 Summary 
HIT that is used to support modern care delivery is safety related and becoming 
increasingly so with the emergence of new technologies, a transition to a paper-
less NHS and the greater involvement of patients in their own health and wellbe-
ing management. Our recent review of current health informatics safety assur-
ance practices has highlighted that whilst the national safety standards provide a 
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principled framework for risk management, the care domain faces challenges in 
key areas that are reducing the achieved effectiveness of the risk management 
activities. To help address these challenges, SMART was developed to provide 
an environment which leads the analyst through a structured process, supports 
the elicitation of pertinent justification and evidence whilst automatically man-
aging the traceability between safety argument components and eliminating the 
burden of documentation. 
Real world application and evaluation of SMART, as a proof of concept tool-
set, has produced positive feedback and supported a decision by NHS Digital to 
commit to the in-house development of an open, robust, scalable and customisa-
ble version that will be publicly made available to care organisations and their 
HIT system manufacturers. 
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